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The view that it is better for life to be created free from disability is pervasive in
both common sense and philosophy. We cast doubt on this view by focusing on an
influential line of thinking that manifests it. That thinking begins with a widely-
discussed principle, Procreative Beneficence, and draws conclusions about parental
choice and disability. After reconstructing two versions of this argument, we cri-
tique the first by exploring the relationship between different understandings of
well-being and disability, and the second by focusing briefly on the idea of a sig-
nificant reason. By placing these results within the broader historical and ongoing
contexts in which the lives of those with disabilities have been deemed of inferior
quality, we conclude with a call for greater humility about disability and well-being
in thought and practice.
1. The disability-free intuition
You are going to create a child. There is no actual child yet, so none
you could benefit or harm now. You simply get to choose which
possible child will later become actual. You are told you have two
options and are given just this information about them: selecting
the first option will very probably lead to a child with a recognized
disability, while selecting the second will very probably lead to a child
with no disabilities whatsoever. Which option should you choose?
(Cf. Savulescu 2001, p. 414.)
You probably want more information before you give a final
answer. But most of you (certainly not all) will also believe the existing
information gives an initial and significant moral reason—one to
weigh against others—to choose the second option. The pervasive
thought is that it is better to create lives free from disability. Call
this the disability-free intuition.
Mind, Vol. 128 . 510 . April 2019  Barker and Wilson 2018
doi:10.1093/mind/fzy039 Advance Access publication 17 September 2018
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/article-abstract/128/510/305/5098725 by guest on 16 M
ay 2019
This common sense intuition is manifest in otherwise diverse philo-
sophical discussions cast in terms of an individual’s well-being—what
is good for that individual (for example, Savulescu and Kahane 2009;
Brock 2005; McMahan 2005; Singer 2001; Kitcher 1997; and Parfit
1987). Despite the ubiquity of the disability-free intuition, it is mis-
taken. In this paper we offer a novel argument in support of this claim.
While building on past criticisms of the disability-free intuition that
stem from specific considerations about disability (for example,
Amundson 2005; Goering 2008; Parens and Asch 1999; and Sparrow
2008) and about its relationship to well-being (for example, Barnes
2009a, 2009b, and 2014), we also develop more general points about
well-being, identifying an unacknowledged hubristic universalism
about levels of well-being that pervades the philosophical literature
on well-being and disability. Recent philosophical work has made a
convincing case against the value-neutrality of appeals to well-being
(Alexandrova 2017), and we view our argument as comporting with
that general view.
Our strategy is to focus on a line of argument that has been
particularly influential in bioethics, the conclusion of which manifests
a specification of the disability-free intuition. This target argument
begins with a widely-discussed principle called Procreative
Beneficence that articulates a putatively general, parental obligation
in creating a child. After carefully reconstructing two versions of the
argument (§2), we critique the first by exploring the relationship be-
tween well-being and disability (§3 and §4) and the second by focusing
more briefly on the idea of a significant reason (§5). Our claim about
hubris in philosophical discussions of disability and well-being, and
our countering call for humility, become more poignant when con-
sidered within the broader historical context of past eugenic practices
that targeted those deemed to have lives of inferior quality, together
with the ongoing influence of those discussions and practices in the
lives of people with disabilities (§6).
2. From procreative beneficence to disability-free procreation
Two of the most prominent defenders of Procreative Beneficence,
Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane, express that principle as follows:
If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and
selection is possible, then they have a significant moral reason to
select the child, of the possible children they could have, whose life
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can be expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go
best or at least not worse than any of the others. (Savulescu and
Kahane 2009, p. 274; see also Savulescu 2001, 2007, and 2008,
Kahane and Savulescu 2009, and Savulescu and Kahane 2011.)
2.1 Procreative beneficence: our aims
Despite Procreative Beneficence’s influence, challenges to it range
from appeals to acceptable thresholds of well-being (for example,
Asch and Wasserman 2005; HerissoneKelly 2006) and the rationality
of random selection (Benatar and Wasserman 2015, p. 218), to the
well-known ‘expressivist critique’ of selective termination (for ex-
ample, Parens and Asch 1999).
Although we share reservations about the truth of Procreative
Beneficence itself, we want to show that those who apply the principle
can also be challenged on their own terms. So we provisionally grant
Procreative Beneficence and focus instead on clarifying and then chal-
lenging reasoning that cascades from it. Although our argument could
be readily adapted to counter analogous reasoning about other traits
(for example, sex), we focus on the case of disability.
2.2 Procreative beneficence: some clarifications
We follow the common practice of understanding a life’s going best in
terms of well-being, and relative to the other lives that could have been
selected. In these terms, Procreative Beneficence says that when select-
ing among possible children, parents have a significant moral reason
to select the one with the highest expected well-being (or one with
expected well-being no lower than any other).
Procreative Beneficence is ‘a species of decision-theoretic conse-
quentialism’ (Savulescu 2008, p. 58). As such, it compares probable
(rather than guaranteed) levels of future well-being when considering
the expected well-being of possible children who become actual. Such
probabilities take account of contextual factors and the principle dir-
ects us to consider our current and foreseeable world, with all its
predictable vagaries and injustices, rather than the expected well-
being of future people in far-off worlds (Savulescu and Kahane 2009).
Procreative Beneficence need not be tied to especially controversial
types of selection. In many places some prospective parents choose to
create a child through in vitro fertilization (IVF). In consultation with
a physician, they often select which of the produced embryos to im-
plant into the womb of the prospective mother or surrogate. Before
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implantation, they can also use preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) to detect chromosomal and genetic features that are usually
viewed as correlating positively or negatively with expected well-being.
PGD has been used to detect sex chromosomes, genes for deafness,
genes for autosomal recessive disorders (for example, cystic fibrosis,
Beta-thalassemia, and type 1 spinal muscular atrophy), genes for auto-
somal dominant disorders (for example, Huntington’s Disease and
myotonic dystrophy), and chromosomal conditions such as Trisomy
21 (Down syndrome).
In such a context, Procreative Beneficence putatively directs paren-
tal decision-making about which embryo(s) to implant. A simple case
can show how the significant moral reasons that Procreative
Beneficence is said to yield derive partly from more specific ones
concerning each type of trait for which relevant information is avail-
able (Savulescu 2001; Savulescu and Kahane 2009).
Suppose that Alison, a prospective parent, has completed IVF and
learned all the relevant available information to emerge from PGD.
The information says that two embryos, A and B, are viable; she will
choose one, having decided that choosing neither is not an option for
her. The information also addresses particular traits, saying that
embryo B will probably develop a type of trait typically thought to
substantially reduce expected child well-being, while A probably will
not develop that trait. To stay focused on the implications of
Procreative Beneficence, also suppose that the expected well-being of
both potential children is above some threshold level. Then, specific to
the type of trait that B will probably develop, Procreative Beneficence
implies that Alison has a significant moral reason to select A instead.
2.3 A trait type version of Procreative Beneficence
Being concerned with probabilities as noted, Procreative Beneficence
will have this implication for any trait that, according to the relevant
information about actual instances of that trait in current contexts and
future instances in foreseeable contexts, substantially reduces well-
being in most of its known cases (Brock 2005, pp. 73–4). Thus we
get a trait type implication of Procreative Beneficence:
Trait Type Principle: If most instances of a trait reduce well-being
substantially, then prospective parents typically have a significant
moral reason to select against creating a child who will probably
develop that trait, provided they could instead create a child who
probably will not develop that trait.
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Note that the broad scope of this principle implies that it is not re-
stricted to ‘severe disease traits’. It would apply as much to being
female or to being an asthmatic, if the relevant available information
suggested that being female or having asthma significantly reduces
expected child well-being compared to the other available selection
options. (See Savulescu 2001.)
2.4 Two disability implications of Procreative Beneficence
The type of trait we are interested in, however, is having a recognized
disability—a paradigmatic disability as understood in the everyday sense,
such as being deaf, being blind, or being intellectually subnormal. Many
paradigmatic disabilities are sometimes thought of as ‘physical disabil-
ities’, but note that paradigmatic disabilities may involve sensory and
cognitive departures from the norm that are not always best thought of
as bodily in nature. By ‘disability ’ we mean all these sorts of paradig-
matic disabilities. Disability so understood does and will continue to
play crucial roles in how prospective parents, clinicians, technicians,
administrators, and policy makers implicitly or explicitly deploy
Procreative Beneficence. Thus, when the Trait Type Principle is nar-
rowed from any type of trait to disability in particular we get:
Modest Disability Principle: If most disabilities reduce well-being
substantially, then prospective parents typically have a significant
moral reason to select against creating a child who will probably
develop a disability, provided they could instead create a child who
probably will not develop that disability.
The antecedent of the Modest Disability Principle—the empirical
claim that most disabilities reduce well-being substantially—is so per-
vasive in both common sense and ethics that Ron Amundson has
called it the ‘Standard View’ (Amundson 2005, p. 103).
Proponents of Procreative Beneficence may not insist on substantial
reduction here, claiming instead that well-being reduction of any
amount suffices to generate the significant moral reason in question,
so long as such reduction is true of most disabilities. This may, for
instance, be what Savulescu and Kahane are suggesting when they say
that ‘somewhat smaller prospects of well-being’ give ‘parents reasons
not to select’ (Savulescu and Kahane 2009, p. 290). This would extend
the moral reach of Procreative Beneficence via the following logically
stronger disability implication:
Bold Disability Principle: If most disabilities reduce well-being to
any degree, then prospective parents typically have a significant
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moral reason to select against creating a child who will probably
develop a disability, provided they could instead create a child who
probably will not develop that disability.
A number of prominent authors at least tacitly draw on one or the
other of these two disability implications of Procreative Beneficence.
Brock, for example, does so (Brock 2005, pp. 73–4) when arguing that
a policy of preventing disability through genetic prenatal screening is
justified. Savulescu does so when claiming that Procreative
Beneficence implies that ‘if we have two embryos which in all respects
appear to be the same, except B has a state which is a [recognized]
disability, then we have a strong reason to choose A’ (Savulescu 2008,
p. 52).
Finally, since both versions of the Disability Principle are about how
recognized disabilities influence well-being in our actual and foresee-
able social contexts, their proponents could embrace the Standard
View while recognizing that well-being reductions correlated with
such disabilities often derive from the non-inclusive social structures
and practices ubiquitous in society. Thus they could also agree with
what Elizabeth Barnes has called the mere-difference view, which says
that ‘having a disability makes you physically non-standard, but it
doesn’t (by itself or automatically) make you worse off ’ (Barnes
2016b, p. 55).1
2.5 Our strategy clarified
Variants of the Standard View plus either the Modest Disability
Principle or the Bold Disability Principle lead to a claim that gives
an exacting voice to the disability-free intuition:
Disability-Free Procreation: Prospective parents typically have a
significant moral reason to select against creating a child who will
probably develop a disability, provided they could instead create a
child who probably will not develop that disability.
Table 1 summarizes two versions of the modus ponens argument we
have, in effect, articulated on behalf of those taking the road from
Procreative Beneficence to Disability-Free Procreation.
Table 1 reveals the more ambitious premise in each version of the
argument. In Version A, the more ambitious claim is the second
1 For introduction of the mere-difference view, see Barnes (2014), and for ongoing dis-
agreement about both how to articulate it and whether it is true, see Barnes (2016a) and
Kahane and Savulescu (2016).
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premise, the Standard View, which is combined with a less ambitious
first premise, the Modest Disability Principle. Version B of the argu-
ment replaces the Standard View with a less ambitious second prem-
ise, accordingly strengthening the first premise to form the more
ambitious Bold Disability Principle. We will argue that both argu-
ments fail because each of their more ambitious premises is false.
In short, even granting Procreative Beneficence, one cannot derive
Disability-Free Procreation, a conclusion about parental choice and
disability that articulates the disability-free intuition. We turn next to
Version A of the target argument and our two-part case against the
Standard View, concentrating first on subjective well-being (§3) and
then on objective well-being (§4).
3. The case against the Standard View: subjective well-being
Empirical researchers distinguished subjective from objective well-
being in the 1980s, partly because they realized that then-prevailing
models of disability (for example, those models provided by the
World Health Organization (1980) and by Nagi (1976)) did not
Table 1. Two versions of the Argument for Disability-Free Procreation
Argument for Disability-Free
Procreation
Argument for Disability-Free
Procreation
Version A Version B
(A1) If most disabilities reduce well-
being substantially, then prospective
parents typically have a significant
moral reason to select against creating
a child who will probably develop a
disability, provided they could instead
create a child who probably will not
develop that disability;
(B1) If most disabilities reduce well-
being to any degree, then prospective
parents typically have a significant
moral reason to select against creat-
ing a child who will probably develop
a disability, provided they could in-
stead create a child who probably will
not develop that disability;
(A2) Most disabilities reduce well-being
substantially;
(B2) Most disabilities reduce well-being
to some degree;
Disability-Free Procreation: Prospective
parents typically have a significant
moral reason to select against creating
a child who will probably develop a
disability, provided they could instead
create a child who probably will not
develop that disability.
Disability-Free Procreation: Prospective
parents typically have a significant
moral reason to select against creat-
ing a child who will probably develop
a disability, provided they could in-
stead create a child who probably will
not develop that disability.
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adequately account for the subjective experiences of persons with
disabilities. Emerging views (Diener 1984; Lawton 1984; Stock, Okun,
and Benin 1986) held that a person’s subjective well-being over some
duration of time is how well that person experiences life to be going
over that period; this was also frequently called subjective quality of
life (QOL) and the authors we cite who use that term can be under-
stood as referring to the same thing (see Camfield and Skevington
2008). Commonly measured components of subjective well-being
have included happiness, life satisfaction, and positive affect or
morale (Fuhrer et al. 1992). Multiple validated scales are now readily
available for measuring each component, with life satisfaction being
one of the most often measured.
When asked via such measures, most disabled people report only
slightly lower QOL than most non-disabled people. Yet as Ron
Amundson has noted, most non-disabled people hold a belief in ten-
sion with this; they think that disabilities ‘have a very strong negative
impact on the quality of life of the individuals who have them’
(Amundson 2005, p. 103). To resolve these differing assessments, we
further develop Amundson’s epistemic challenges to the Standard
View by clarifying the distinction between subjective and objective
well-being and how that distinction uncovers the depth of the chal-
lenges and the radical limits to ‘our’ knowledge of disability.
First, the all too common claim that non-disabled onlookers have a
more accurate window into the subjective well-being of disabled
people than do those people themselves reflects the same sort of
hubris we now identify in bygone claims that men have a more accu-
rate understanding of the subjective well-being of women than women
themselves do, or that ‘first world’ people enjoy such a vantage point
with respect to the subjective well-being of people in the ‘developing
world’. This alone should suffice for us to have more humility about
‘our’ views of well-being and disability. Yet the tendency for non-
disabled people to severely underestimate the subjective well-being
of disabled people is so entrenched within philosophy that we sum-
marize some of the relevant empirical findings.
Fuhrer and colleagues measured life satisfaction in a cross-sectional
study of persons living with spinal cord injury (SCI), including per-
sons having SCI from birth. Their ‘findings by no means indicate that
people with SCI are uniformly less satisfied with their lives than are
people generally ’ (Fuhrer et al. 1992, p. 555), discovering no statistic-
ally significant association between measures of life satisfaction and
measures of extent of paralysis, nor between measures of life
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satisfaction and neurological classification recommended by previous
studies. In short, people suffering spinal injuries typically do not
report significantly lower quality of life than other people. The same
appears true of those with everyday disabilities related to vision, hear-
ing, intellect, and mental health; Menhart et al. (1990) found that
people with conditions of these latter sorts typically reported even
greater life satisfaction than those with more physical disabilities.
In an earlier study of mobility-disabled persons without SCI,
Stensman (1985) found little difference between their mean ratings
of subjective QOL and those of a non-disabled control group (cf.
Fuhrer et al. 1992, p. 555). Focused on just intellectual disability, a
more recent study found that when subjects with epilepsy also had
intellectual disabilities, they tended to have higher subjective QOL
than those without the intellectual disabilities (Endermann 2013,
p. 193). This effect of intellectual disabilities seemed relatively inde-
pendent of having epilepsy, as the more physical epilepsy variables
‘such as seizure frequency…did not affect global [that is, subjective]
QOL’ (Endermann 2013, p. 194). Perhaps more strikingly, Padua et al.
(2002) found that the more that persons with spina bifida were dis-
abled, the higher they tended to score on components of subjective
QOL.
The above studies all examined subjective well-being during rela-
tively narrow time slices in the lives of disabled persons. Longitudinal
data on subjective well-being is less plentiful, but exists. Gow et al.
(2005) made use of the Lothian Birth Cohort 1921, a group of 550 older
people whose mental abilities had already been assessed at mean ages
10.9 and 79.1 years. The researchers found that cohort members’ sat-
isfaction with life at about age 80 ‘was unrelated to IQ in either child-
hood or late adulthood’ and unrelated ‘to cognitive change in their
lifetime’ (Gow et al. 2005, p. 142). So in this cohort, being less cogni-
tively able than others at an early age did not predict lower life satis-
faction later; being less cognitively able at the later age also did not
matter to life satisfaction at that age, and neither did drops in cogni-
tive ability over a lifetime. The conclusions from this longitudinal
study comport with Diener’s (1984) earlier finding that life satisfaction
‘does not seem to be related to current cognitive ability ’ (Gow et al.
2005, p. 141).2
2 Although some studies find reduced life satisfaction levels after acquiring a severe dis-
ability (for example, Lucas et al. 2003), they are not directly relevant to typical cases of pro-
creative selection because the disabilities typically at issue during procreative selection are ones
that a person has from birth. See also Lucas (2007) for an influential analysis of two
Mind, Vol. 128 . 510 . April 2019  Barker and Wilson 2018
Well-being, Disability, and Choosing Children 313
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/article-abstract/128/510/305/5098725 by guest on 16 M
ay 2019
Thus these empirical studies cut across the divisions between dis-
abilities that are ‘physical’ and ‘cognitive’, and those that range from
shorter to longer durations of focus. Such studies are currently the
best grounds that non-disabled people have for forming beliefs about
the relative subjective well-being of disabled people—far better than
their intuitions based on introspection and limited interpersonal ex-
periences with disabled people. Beyond such intuitions, there is no
good reason to believe that people with varying disabilities—spina
bifida, people with epilepsy, people who are deaf, people with sub-
normal IQ, people with low mobility, and so on—all tend toward
mistaken assessments of their own subjective well-being.
Importantly, a sceptic here cannot support her view by claiming
that many disabled people have higher-than-expected subjective well-
being merely because they have formed preferences and goals that are
objectively suboptimal. That would simply be a change in subject: from
a question about subjective to objective well-being. (The same is true
of the claim that disabled people reporting high subjective well-being
fail to appreciate the challenges their disabilities pose.)3
We suspect that not only the Standard View but also lingering
doubts about the empirical studies manifest a two-fold hubris about
disability and well-being, encompassing both the difficulty of appre-
ciating how life is experienced by others who happen to have a dis-
ability (Amundson 2005; Moller 2011) and the meta-difficulty of
recognizing and addressing the extent of the first difficulty (Ubel
et al. 2005, p. S61). We return to such suspicions and doubts in §4,
where we will argue that disability hubris also pervades discussions of
objective well-being.
longitudinal studies cast in terms of ‘hedonic adaptation’ that argues for both significant drops
in happiness following the onset of disability and a failure in hedonic adaptation,
and Powdthavee (2009) and Paga´n-Rodriguez (2010) for alternative analyses. Likewise, we
set aside cases in which a disability results in, or is constituted by, high, continuous levels
of pain over long periods—where one would expect reports of subjective well-being to be
low—since they represent a special case and are not representative of most disabilities.
3 As the editors have helpfully pointed out, the majority of the relevant work on subjective
well-being relies on methods, such as surveys or questionnaires, that presuppose a certain level
of cognitive sophistication, and so they may limit what conclusions we can draw about well-
being in those without that sophistication. Some may take this as a reason to expect current
methods to overestimate well-being in people with disabilities. But in accord with the general
argument we are making, including specific epistemic obstacles we identify, we would encour-
age more humility about what to infer about disability and well-being from this methodo-
logical limitation.
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4. The case against the Standard View: objective well-being
The standard example of a hypothetical happy slave is often taken to
suggest that there is more to well-being than how one feels, exem-
plifying that subjective well-being may be high while objective well-
being is low. If our conclusions about subjective well-being are correct,
the next question relevant to evaluating Version A of the Argument
for Disability-Free Procreation concerns this alternative conception of
well-being: should we believe that most disabilities reduce objective
well-being substantially?
The answer depends on which activities, states, and so on, we be-
lieve are constitutive of—components of—objective well-being.
Consider three components that Dan Brock has posited in his support
for the Standard View about objective well-being:
. ability to perform major life activities, such as walking and
seeing;
. a relatively high level of mobility;
. a significant degree of social and political liberty.4
To argue that we should not believe most disabilities reduce objective
well-being substantially, we distinguish two ways of conceiving of the
relationship between objective and subjective well-being. On either
conception, problems arise for typical identifications of components
of objective well-being. It is not merely that it is hard, in usual or
otherwise mundane ways, to figure out what the components are.
Rather, by uncovering and reflecting on the relevant counterfactuals,
standpoint biases, and the structure of well-being, we argue that each
conception of objective well-being throws up distinct and decisive
epistemic obstacles to the claim that most disabilities substantially
reduce objective well-being.
4.1 Dependent objective well-being
On the first conception, causation takes central importance, as it does
in the constitution of many scientific categories (Boyd 1999). The
constitutive components of objective well-being are the main causal
4 Brock (1995) presumes the first criterion when discussing the Americans with Disabilities
Act (Amundson 2005). He states the second criterion when interpreting the Health Status
Index (HSI) as measuring constitutive components of objective well-being (Brock 1993). And
he implies something like the third when deploying a version of the happy slave example
(Brock 2005).
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factors of the subjective well-being of people, regardless of whether
people are aware of (or confused about) those factors being the typical
causes of subjective well-being. Some authors propose the above mo-
bility criterion in this way when positing that relatively high mobility
is a main causal enhancer of subjective QOL (for example, Brock
1993). (For such authors, this putative objective causal relationship
is claimed to hold despite the failure of some people with low mobility
to appreciate this in their self-reported QOL.) Because the requisite
notion of objective well-being is dependent on typical main causal
connections with subjective well-being, we call it ‘dependent objective
well-being’ (DOW).
No doubt, a few disabled people sometimes over-report their own
subjective well-being partly by not accurately dwelling on how their
low mobility really, objectively, causes reduction in their subjective
QOL. But when the subjective QOL reports of many people with
mobility-related disabilities suggest that low mobility typically does
not cause large net reductions in their subjective well-being, this
should be interpreted as strong evidence that low mobility is not,
objectively, a large draw on subjective well-being, that is, it is not a
component of DOW. There are many such reports, some gathered in
the Stensmen study cited above. (See also Domello¨f, Hedlund, and
O¨dman 2013.) Studies of other disabilities and variables have found
similar contrary evidence by different means, using measures of
health-related quality of life in which the physical variables are
thought of as components of what we term DOW (Gavelova et al.
2015; Endermann 2013, p. 193). More generally, given the study results
described in §3 it is very probable that disabled and non-disabled
people score similarly on whichever variables really are the main
causal enhancers of subjective well-being, even if these are similar
scores on different variables. Two of the enhancers hypothesized to
be especially important for many disabled people, based on investiga-
tions of contextual interactions between variables of quality of life
using conditional independence graphs, are being in close relation-
ships (for example, being married) and having social support
(Fellinghauer et al. 2012). Since such enhancers just are the compo-
nents of DOW, we should reject the view that most disabilities sub-
stantially reduce such well-being.
The contrary view, held perhaps by the non-disabled person in the
street as well as by prominent philosophers (for example, Brock 1993,
p. 309), does not sufficiently appreciate the relevant experiences of and
data about disabled persons (cf. Goering 2008; Amundson 2005), as we
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suggested was the case for subjective well-being. We further elaborate
on the operation of such hubris by detailing two limitations of im-
agination that we believe fuel it.
The first turns on the multiple realization of subjective well-being.
There are many different paths to experiencing a well-lived life, and
these vary in their degree of overlap. Factors like mobility, for in-
stance, may be objectively large causal factors shared by many but
not all paths to subjective well-being; on other paths, people with
low mobility often find alternative ways to achieve subjective well-
being, and so low mobility becomes a small factor. We are all prone
to misjudge which factors are objectively the main causal influences on
the subjective well-being of others, especially when our first-person
paths to subjective well-being diverge.
The second turns on a mistake in what we imagine. For a non-
disabled person, especially someone with limited shared experiences
with disabled people, it is tempting to rely on the following sort of
counterfactual when thinking about the objective influences on sub-
jective well-being:
If I, a very mobile non-disabled person, became disabled in a way
that significantly reduced my mobility, this reduced mobility would
probably significantly reduce my subjective well-being.
Much research indicates that this counterfactual is true for many non-
disabled people (for example, Lucas 2007). The counterfactual
encourages them to consider losing something (high mobility) they
have come to subjectively value through their experience, and then
imagine losing that. Yet this makes the counterfactual distorting in the
present context because we are focusing on disabilities that are pre-
dictable (by methods such as PGD) prior to birth, and these typically
(though not always) are early-onset, lifelong states of being. A person
with reduced mobility of this sort typically never directly experienced
mobility, and so never lost it. For her, low mobility is a state that has
simply always been, as Deborah Kent says of her blindness, a ‘part of
the background music that accompanied [her] life’ (Kent 2000, p. 57).
The counterfactual’s antecedent thus focuses on the wrong candidate
objective cause of significantly reduced subjective well-being. The rele-
vant counterfactuals—of the form ‘If I had had limited mobility from
birth, my subjective well-being would probably have been significantly
lower’—are significantly more complicated, and very likely better as-
sessed by deferring to the views of people with the relevant lived ex-
perience of disability. We suggest that the same is true of late-onset
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conditions, such as Huntington’s disease or age-related dementia,
where intuitions about loss are probably widely shared but may not
be reliable guides to post-transitional subjective well-being.
4.2 Independent objective well-being
Call well-being whose components needn’t typically cause or consti-
tute subjective well-being ‘independent objective well-being’ (IOW).
Note that this characterization of IOW does not rule out that com-
ponents of an agent’s IOW must be valued by that agent (for example,
see Glover 2008) nor that subjective well-being may itself be a com-
ponent of IOW, as some objective list theorists have argued (see, Crisp
2014).
General problems in identifying the constitutive components of
IOW have been recognized in claims of the putative cultural paro-
chialism of perhaps the best-known attempt to enumerate and ground
the objective goods necessary for human flourishing: Martha
Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities approach (for example,
2001). Problems of identifying the constitutive components of IOW
are especially acute in the context of the experiential variability be-
tween disabled and non-disabled persons. If well-being is to be as-
sessed in terms of individual capabilities independent of that
individual’s subjective reports, this approach to well-being is prone
to dismiss the well-being of those lacking designated individual cap-
abilities, such as those associated with any of the five senses, or bodily
integrity, or physical health. (Also see Barnes 2009a.) This is so despite
Nussbaum’s own attempts (for example, Nussbaum 2009) to apply the
capabilities approach to disability (Wasserman et al. 2016).
On the dependent conception of well-being, identifications from
non-disabled people proved unreliable because they were not in-
formed appropriately by the views of disabled people. On the inde-
pendent conception, by contrast, such identifications are impossible
because no people—non-disabled or disabled—are in the relevant
epistemic position. Or so we will argue.
The process of correctly identifying a component, X, of independ-
ent well-being can be thought of as involving the posing of the follow-
ing counterfactual to oneself:
Even if X were to cause no effect in my subjective well-being, X
would nonetheless contribute to my objective well-being.
There may be near universal agreement about such counterfactuals
when we consider political values such as various freedoms, including
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(say) freedom from physical constraint. But such agreement dissolves,
for good reason, once we turn to traits that correspond to bodily, lived
conditions that vary across people.
Consider walking or seeing. We think that these are valuable pri-
marily because of their causal influence on subjective well-being in
many cases, typically via their instrumental role in allowing people to
achieve other goals. But suppose that they didn’t have such influence.
Would they still be components of well-being? Those who don’t walk
and those who don’t see will have little trouble answering ‘No’ to this
question; those who do walk and see will at least waver in response.
Each of these responses reflects a value or bias structured by varied
lived experiences. The same is true for activities characterized at coar-
ser grains of description, such as relatively high levels of mobility and
access to information, activities that might be realized by (respect-
ively) walking or seeing.
The broader problem is that the value of many (if not all) such
candidate capacities and activities clearly depends on what they are
coinstantiated with, including the kinds of social environments in
which they occur. Clearly, a person’s being blind or sighted, or non-
perambulatory or someone who walks, affects what the components of
her independent objective well-being are, even if the components are
not significantly causally related to her subjective well-being, and even
if the person does not recognize those components as valuable (Moller
2011, pp. 197–200). Less clearly, but no less surely, the things that
cluster with being blind or sighted, or non-perambulatory or someone
who walks, also affect what the components of a person’s independent
objective well-being are. Whether one can see, for example, clusters
with abilities to interact with rapidly-moving objects by monitoring
visual feedback, and so affects whether participation in so-called ‘con-
tact sports’, and many other popular physical activities, are compo-
nents of one’s independent objective well-being. While these
correlations and effects are only tendential, patterns of difference be-
tween disabled and non-disabled people in these respects will thus
generate patterns of difference in components of independent object-
ive well-being.
Most importantly for present purposes, such patterns of difference
affect how any agent views the value of various capacities. This makes
it reasonable to believe that, for at least many recognized disabilities,
there is no privileged or convergent epistemic position from which the
requisite counterfactuals can be assessed. Thus, in this context, a
healthy scepticism is in order for attempts to individuate candidate
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necessary or sufficient conditions for independent objective well-
being.
4.3 Well-being and disability-free procreation
So whichever concept of objective well-being we choose, epistemic
obstacles suggest we should not believe that most disabilities reduce
objective well-being substantially. We saw this was more than a ‘mere
difficulty ’ in identifying components of objective well-being. Instead,
in this context people are anchored to disparate epistemic positions in
ways that provide principled reasons to be sceptical that an appeal to
objective well-being will provide an independent pathway to the view
that disabilities substantially reduce well-being. To support this, we
identified a systematic bias in the case of dependent well-being, and
pointed to features of the structure of well-being in the case of inde-
pendent well-being.
Together with our previous result about subjective well-being, this
suggests we should not believe that most disabilities reduce objective
or subjective well-being substantially. Thus we should not believe the
Standard View, which is premise (A2) in Version A of the Argument
for Disability-Free Procreation.
Might one retreat to Version B of that argument? We now turn to
consider, more briefly, that version, which relies not on the Standard
View but a weaker replacement of it, together with what we have called
the Bold Disability Principle.
5. Against the Bold Disability Principle
Let us simply grant premise (B2) and suppose that most disabilities do
at least reduce well-being to some small degree. We target (B1), the
Bold Disability Principle, by focusing on the notion of a significant
reason.
5.1 Significant reasons
Savulescu and Kahane are clear that ‘even if the expected well-being of
a future child should weigh less than the expected well-being of exist-
ing children, reasons of PB [Procreative Beneficence] will still be sig-
nificant reasons—reasons often strong enough to outweigh the
reasons given by the interests of parents and other existing people’
(Savulescu and Kahane 2009, p. 277). To exemplify this, they note that
many people believe that failing to help existing deaf children to hear is
Mind, Vol. 128 . 510 . April 2019  Barker and Wilson 2018
320 Matthew J. Barker and Robert A. Wilson
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/article-abstract/128/510/305/5098725 by guest on 16 M
ay 2019
worse than allowing a deaf child to be born instead of a hearing one.
They insist, nonetheless, that the moral reason to disallow the deaf
child to be born in the first place is still significant, the sort that out-
weighs the interests of parents and others.
Such putative significance implies practical decision-making sway.
We will argue that the reasons generated by small reductions in well-
being that we are supposing to exist should seldom hold that sway.
Two considerations support this.
5.2 Factors that vary with well-being reductions
First, the main factor that varies directly with the significance of moral
reasons yielded by the Bold Disability Principle is the degree of expected
reduction in well-being: the greater that reduction, the more significant
the reason. But having already rejected (A2), we are now considering
just cases where that expected reduction is small, and hence the asso-
ciated significance of the reason generated will very often or always be
correspondingly limited.
Second, the relative significance of any one reason yielded by the
Bold Disability Principle varies inversely with both the number and
weight of other reasons. This inverse relationship holds even when
such other reasons agree with, that is, point to the same choice as, the
reason in question yielded by the Bold Disability Principle. Since these
other reasons are numerous, it is unlikely that any particular reason
yielded by the Bold Disability Principle is relatively significant in the
way envisaged by proponents of the Argument for Disability-Free
Procreation.
First consider other reasons that, putatively, PB yields. Recall
Alison’s choice between embryo A and embryo B, where there is a
particular trait that B but not A is expected to have, and which slightly
diminishes B’s expected well-being. Suppose the trait involves a slight
decrease in mobility. Accordingly, PB would then yield one reason
against selecting B and in favour of selecting A. However, Alison
plans to raise her child in contexts where males usually have many
advantages over females, and B has XY sex chromosomes while A has
XX sex chromosomes. Thus in addition to the reason PB will yield for
selecting A over B based on B’s expected lower mobility, PB will also
yield a reason for selecting B over A, based on their sex differences. A
great many traits will differentially influence the expected well-being
of the two embryos in these (often small) ways. So PB will yield a great
many reasons additional to the one based on B’s lower mobility. With
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so many other PB reasons yielded, the significance of the particular PB
reason based in B’s slightly lower mobility diminishes.
But reasons independent of Procreative Beneficence will diminish
the significance of any particular disability-related reason the most,
because many of those independent reasons will be relatively weighty.
Prospective parents will have many desires and preferences concerning
their own lives and how they care and provide for their children.
When small reductions in expected well-being are considered sepa-
rately from these parental reasons, they are likely to pale in signifi-
cance. This is not least because the interests and well-being of
prospective parents are actual, and the levels of expected well-being
in possible children are not.
It is true that procreative choices of the sorts we are considering can
cause the aggregate level of well-being in a population to be different
than it would have been had alternative choices been made. But as
aficionados of the non-identity problem know well, such differences
between the actual and hypothetical levels of well-being cannot be
differences for an actual individual brought into existence by the
choice, because the alternative choice would have precluded that in-
dividual from having existed at all. So it is impossible for such choices
to affect (improve, worsen or sustain) the level of well-being in any
such individual. This impotency of such choices certainly diminishes
the relative decision-making significance of any reasons yielded by the
Bold Disability Principle (cf. Benatar and Wasserman 2015, p. 218)
without preventing them from being moral reasons, or reasons
at all. Thus while it is controversial to respond to the non-identity
problem by saying that considerations of merely possible people
yield no moral reasons for action at all, this is not a position we
must take.5
To sum up, in actual decision-making the moral reasons the
Bold Disability Principle often yields do not have the importance
implied by premise (B1) in the Argument for Disability-Free
Procreation.
5 Those swayed by judgments about such cases as Parfit’s The Medical Programmes (Parfit
1987, p. 367) to accept his ‘no difference principle’, which downplays the significance of
person-affecting interests, may baulk here. We think, however, that the evidential force of
intuitions and judgments about such cases should be questioned at least to the extent that they
reflect the biases uncovered in our paper. Elizabeth Barnes has likewise criticized distinct
(though kindred) thought experiments for simply begging the question against those who
believe it is not always wrong to cause a disabled child to exist when a non-disabled child
could have been caused to exist instead (Barnes 2014, pp. 106–9).
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6. Concluding thoughts: disability humility
We have seen that both versions of the argument that leads from the
general principle of Procreative Beneficence to Disability-Free
Procreation fail, and we suspect that there is, in effect, a crucial
equivocation in the chain of reasoning from Procreative Beneficence
to disability-specific conclusions. Since Disability-Free Procreation is a
more exact expression of the common and widely accepted disability-
free intuition—the idea that rather than creating disabled children it is
much better to create normal ones—our argument also questions
what has been taken as common sense, thereby complementing exist-
ing critiques of this intuition (Amundson 2005, Barnes 2014, 2016b).
And given that the reasoning we have critiqued is perhaps the most
plausible and common way in the bioethics literature to justify
Disability-Free Procreation, the argument has relevance not only for
existing philosophical discussions but for bioethics more generally.
Both the disability-free intuition and the more scholarly articula-
tions of ideas and principles behind it reflect shortcomings in the basic
epistemic and moral virtue of humility in the realm of disability.
Philosophers and bioethicists seem no less hubristic about disability
and well-being than others, and we further hypothesize that those
professional shortcomings stem at least in part from the marginalized
position of people with disabilities in the discipline of philosophy,
both historically and at present. The call with which we began this
paper—the call for readers to imagine whether they would choose to
create a child with or without a disability and positing how ‘most of
you’ would respond—in fact relies on that marginalization.
Our call for more collective humility here is made more poignant by
the reminder that the devalued estimation of the quality of the lives of
people with disabilities on purportedly objective grounds played a
critical role in the eugenic targeting of disabled people in the past
(Wilson and St. Pierre 2016). The move from Procreative
Beneficence to its disability-specific derivatives relies on that same
devaluation, devaluation which, we have argued, arises from episte-
mically troubled assumptions rather than the now robust literature on
first-person reports of well-being from people with disabilities.
To be clear, while we do not think that Procreative Beneficence is
itself eugenic in nature, we see the kind of disability hubris that it
relies on to derive conclusions about disability and well-being as con-
tributing to a eugenic view of disability as, primarily, something to be
pitied, regretted, and eliminated (Garland-Thomson 2012). Part of
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reclaiming disability as human variation, rather than seeing it as es-
sentially defective, is to challenge this underlying eliminativist logic
and the conception of disability from which it derives (Barnes 2016b).
The present paper is a small attempt to do just that within contem-
porary discussions that have come quickly to occupy a central place in
philosophical admonitions about parental choice.6
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